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INDEFINITELY RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT
WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER1
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we raise questions concerning the widely accepted proposition that economic efficiency requires that copyright protection should be limited in its duration.2 The Constitution authorizes Congress to create copyright
and patent protection “for limited Times.”3 The first federal copyright act was
enacted in 1790 and provided for an initial term of 14 years plus a renewal
term of the same length, provided the author was still living at the end of the
initial term. The initial term was lengthened to 28 years in 1831, and the renewal term to 28 years in 1909 and to 47 years beginning in 1962. The Copyright Act of 1976 switched from a fixed to a variable, but still limited, term
equal to the life of the author plus 50 years, increased to 70 years in 1998 by
the Copyright Term Extension Act (popularly known as the “Sonny Bono” Act).
Until the 1976 Act, federal copyright protection was largely limited to published works, other works being mainly protected by (state) common law copyright, which had no time limit, although an unpublished work could be federally copyrighted by being registered with the Copyright Office, and a substantial fraction of all federally copyrighted works were of this character.4 Except
in the case of works for hire (works in which the employer, or occasionally
other hirers, of the actual creator of the work is the copyright owner), publication lost much of its significance under the 1976 Act, which protects work fixed
in a tangible form, whether or not it is published. As for works for hire, the
1976 Act fixed a term of 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation,
whichever expired first; the Sonny Bono Act extended these terms to 95 and
120 years. The 1976 Act also made works created January 1, 1978 nonrenew1

Landes is the Clifton R. Musser Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Chicago. Posner is a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. We thank Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell, and
participants in the Harvard Law School’s law and economics workshop (where a previous version of this paper was given on March 12, 2002), along with Michael Abramowicz, Scott Kieff,
Lawrence Lessig, and especially Jane Ginsburg and Douglas Lichtman, for extensive and
highly valuable comments on a previous draft, and Peter Broadbent, Bryan Dayton, and especially Brian Grill for their excellent research assistance.
2 See, for example, Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 01–618, May 20, 2002.
3 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. On the history of this provision and specifically its reference to
“limited Times,” see the exhaustive treatment in Edward C. Walterscheid, “Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause,” 7 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 315 (2000). See generally Malla Pollack, “What Is Congress Supposed
to Promote? Defining ‘Progress’ in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause” (forthcoming in Nebraska Law Review).
4 From July 1, 1974 through September 30, 1977, unpublished works comprised about 30 percent of new copyright registrations. See the Annual Reports of the Register of Copyright for
the years 1975-77.
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able, but it allowed assignments and other transfers of copyrights to be terminated by the author or his heirs.
The legal significance of the Constitution’s phrase “limited Times” is unclear (the motivation—a hostility deeply rooted in Anglo-American law and
politics to government-conferred monopoly—is clear enough). Any time short of
infinity, which is to say any fixed period of years, is “limited” in the literal
sense of the word; and even if “limited” means something far short of infinity,
this limitation might conceivably be got ’round by allowing repeated extensions
of the copyright term. Renewals and extensions of patents and copyrights had
been common in England in the eighteenth century, though on an individual
rather than wholesale basis, and it was English practice that provided the
model and inspiration for the copyright clause of the Constitution and for the
early federal copyright statutes.5 Then too, common law copyright (now largely
preempted by the federal copyright statute, however) is perpetual; and so it is
conceivable that states could recognize copyright after the expiration of federal
copyright protection if the federal copyright law disclaimed any intention of
preempting state law.6 And while Congress could not grant perpetual copyright under the authority of the Constitution’s copyright clause, maybe it could
do so under other grants of power to Congress, such as the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce. That seems unlikely, however, since the
framers clearly intended to limit as well as confer congressional authority to
grant patents and copyrights. In any event, we are interested in the economics
of indefinitely renewing the copyright term and express no view on its legality,
which may soon be decided by the Supreme Court.7
In this paper, we use the term “indefinite renewal” rather than “perpetual”
copyright because there is an important economic difference between granting
perpetual copyrights and granting copyrights for a limited time with, however,
a right to renew the copyright as many times as the owner (including the
original owner’s heirs and other successors) wants. We recognize that the present system of fixed nonrenewable copyright terms and a system of indefinite
renewals are not the only alternatives. In particular, a system of indefinite renewals could have an upper bound: perhaps an initial term of 20 years and a
maximum of six renewal terms of 10 years each, for a maximum duration of
100 years. We shall consider this alternative to a “pure” system of indefinite
renewals at various points in the paper.
Although a copyright that could be renewed indefinitely could turn out to
be perpetual, this is unlikely for any but a tiny fraction of all copyrights. In the
empirical analysis of the paper we shall see that fewer than 11 percent of the
copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964 were renewed at the end of their

5
6
7

Walterscheid, note 3 above, at 355–356, 364.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–167 (1989).
See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), certiorari granted under the name Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002).
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28-year term, even though the cost of renewal was small.8 And only a tiny fraction of the books ever published are still in print; for example, of 10,027 books
published in the United States in 1930, only 174 were still in print in 2001—
1.7 percent.9 These data suggest that most copyrights depreciate rapidly and
therefore that few would be renewed if even a slight fee were required; the
sheer bother of applying for renewal appears to be a significant deterrent. The
in-print data are indeed merely suggestive, since it costs more to keep a book
in print than to renew a copyright and since a copyrighted work’s derivative
works may have commercial value after the original work has lost it. Nevertheless, it is apparent that even with an unlimited right of renewal the public
domain would remain a vast repository of intellectual “property” (in a legal
sense, nonproperty) available for use without charge and also usable as free
inputs into the creation of new intellectual property. Paradoxically, a system of
unlimited renewals might, depending on the length of the initial term and on
the fee structure, expand the number of works in the public domain, although
the average (and conceivably the total) value of the works in the public domain
might fall since copyright in the most valuable works would probably be renewed many times.
Furthermore, it is a mistake to treat the public domain as some fixed supply of works from which any enlargement of copyright protection subtracts.
The size of the public domain is in part a positive function of the extent of
copyright protection, since, as a first approximation anyway, the more extensive that protection is, the greater the incentive to create intellectual property
some fraction of which will become a part of the public domain when the copyright expires or, under the system we are suggesting, is not renewed.
The paper is organized as follows. Part II is a critical review of the economic arguments for limiting the duration of copyright protection. Part III
questions the conventional view that the public-good character of intellectual
property implies that once a copyrighted work falls into the public domain, it
will be allocated and exploited efficiently; we show that just as an absence of
property rights in tangible property would lead to inefficiencies, so intangible
works denied copyright protection may be exploited inefficiently because of
congestion externalities and because of impaired incentives to invest in maintaining and exploiting these works. Part IV presents our empirical analysis of
the expected duration of copyrights and trademarks, using data on registra8

The renewal fee was $1 from 1909 to 1947, $2 from 1948 to 1965, $4 from 1966 to 1977, $6
from 1978 to 1990, $12 from 1991 to 1992, $20 from 1993 to 1999, and $45 from 2000 to the
present. Prior to 1992, a copyright holder who wanted to renew his copyright had to file a renewal application during the last year of the initial copyright term. An amendment that year
to the Copyright Act made renewals automatic, although there still are some benefits to filing
for renewal registration. See Robert A. Gorman and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases and
Materials 356–357 (6th ed. 2002).
9 We are indebted for this computation to Lawrence Lessig, who based it on data in American
Library Annual and Book Trade Almanac for 1872–1957; The Bowker Annual (same publication, new title) for 1974; and Books in Print, Bowker.com.
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tions and renewals over the past 90 years. Our interest in trademark renewals
derives from the fact that trademarks may be renewed indefinitely for 10-year
periods, and an empirical analysis of these renewals may cast light on the
likely performance of a system of indefinite renewals for copyrights. We find
that both copyrights and trademarks are subject to significant depreciation
and have an expected or average life of only about 15 years, and also that renewal rates are highly sensitive to renewal fees. These findings suggest that a
system of indefinite copyright renewals need not starve the public domain.
Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF A LIMITED COPYRIGHT TERM
Two propositions are widely believed by most economists; it is the unrecognized tension between them that makes the question of a limited versus indefinite copyright term an interesting and difficult one. The first proposition is
that so far as is feasible, all valuable resources, including copyrightable works,
should be owned, in order to create incentives for their efficient exploitation
and to avoid overuse. The second proposition is that copyright should be limited in duration. The reasons are several: (1) tracing costs increase with the
length of copyright protection; (2) transaction costs may be prohibitive if creators of new intellectual property must obtain licenses to use all the previous
intellectual property they seek to incorporate;10 (3) because intellectual property is a public good, any positive price for its use will induce both consumers
and creators of subsequent intellectual property to substitute inputs that cost
society more to produce or are of lower quality, assuming (realistically however) that copyright holders cannot perfectly price discriminate;11 (4) because
of discounting to present value, incentives to create intellectual property are
not materially affected by cutting off intellectual-property rights after many
years, just as those incentives would not be materially affected if, during the
limited copyright term, lucrative new markets for the copyrighted work, unforeseen when the work was created, emerged;12 (5) in any event, retroactive
extensions of copyright should not be granted, because such extensions do not

10

The point emphasized in our previous paper on copyright law, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,” 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325
(1989).
11 The second and third points both rest on the fact emphasized in our article that creators of
intellectual property characteristically build heavily on earlier such property rather than creating ex nihilo.
12 One must be cautious, however, in asserting that “unforeseen” opportunities will not affect
incentives. A particular new market may be unforeseen or unanticipated yet may be part of a
class of markets that when the work was created had a foreseen, positive probability of coming
into existence, and therefore may have influenced the incentive to create the work. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, “Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination,” 101
Columbia Law Review 1613 (2001).
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affect the incentive to create works already in existence;13 but (6) the possibility of such extensions invites rent seeking.
These six points taken together imply that the optimal term of copyright
protection is determined by balancing at the margin the incentive effects of a
longer term against both the administrative and the access costs arising from
the public goods aspect of intellectual property; by “access costs” we mean both
the deadweight losses from limiting output and the transaction costs involved
in obtaining a license from the copyright owner granting access to a copyrighted work. Since the incremental incentive to create new works as a function of a longer term is likely to be very small (given discounting and depreciation) beyond a term of 25 years or so,14 access costs will tend to dominate, implying an optimal copyright term considerably shorter than the current term of
life plus 70 years. Thus the second proposition denies the first (valuable resources should be owned) and asserts that copyrightable intellectual property
should be taken out of private ownership and placed in the public domain after
a period of years no greater than necessary to induce the socially efficient incentives to create new works. But is the second proposition sound? It may be,
for there undoubtedly are cases in which property rights cost more than they
are worth (a homely example: shopping malls that do not charge for parking,
thus treating their parking lot as a commons). It has seemed so to many students of copyright, but its soundness no longer seems obvious to us.15
A. Tracing Costs
The argument for limiting copyright duration because of tracing costs is
superficial except in explaining why common law copyright in unpublished
works was (before the 1976 Copyright Act) perpetual: because there is usually
only one copy of such works, the cost of determining the copyright holder’s
identity is trivial unless the copy has passed through many hands.16 The argument for limiting duration is superficial in other contexts not because the
costs of tracing the ownership of copyrighted works are inherently slight but
13

Not literally zero, because knowledge of the possibility of a future lengthening of the copyright term might have some, though probably very small, incentive effects.
14 For example, suppose a copyright would yield $1 per year in perpetuity at a discount rate of
10 percent. Under a system of perpetual copyright, the present value of this infinite stream of
income would equal $10 (=1/r). Under a limited copyright term (=t) the present value would be
(1–e–rt)/r. Hence if t=25 and r=.10, the present value of $1 per year for 25 years is $9.18, which
is more than 90 percent of the present value of a perpetual copyright. If the value of the copyright depreciates by, say, 5 percent per year, the difference in present value between a perpetual and 25-year copyright is only about 2½ percent ($6.67 versus $6.51).
15 See Landes and Posner, note 9 above, for the arguments in favor of a limited term.
16 An example is the discovery of a unpublished manuscript in the library of Harvard University of a novel entitled Inheritance, written by Louisa May Alcott in 1849. It had been miscatalogued for many years and no one knew of its existence. Although Alcott was childless, the
copyright holders—fourth-generation descendants of Alcott’s father—were not difficult to locate. See Lawrence Van Gelder, “Uncovered at Harvard: Alcott’s First Novel,” N.Y. Times, May
1, 1996, p. C15.
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because they could probably be made slight by modest institutional reforms.
Enormous tracing costs would be incurred by any would-be publisher of a new
translation of the Iliad if the heirs of Homer could enforce copyright in the
work, but that is only because no one knows who those heirs are. Equally immense tracing costs would be required to determine the ownership of a parcel
of land if title to land were not recorded in a public registry. It is not perpetual
property rights but absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing
costs.
Were a system of indefinitely renewable copyright to be instituted today
but limited to works created after the system was in place, there need be no
great difficulty in identifying copyright owners a century or for that matter a
millennium hence if, for example, the law required copyright owners to reregister their copyrights every 10 or even 25 years in some central registry under
the name of the copyright holder and to notify the registry in the event the
copyright was transferred. The owner would be required to provide the registry
with his address and notify it of any changes of address; a transferee would
likewise be required to furnish this information to the registry. Then a search
of the registry under the name of the original owner would reveal the address
of the copyright holder from whom a license would have to be sought. The
analogy is to the registries in which titles to real estate are recorded and to the
Uniform Commercial Code registries in which security interests in personal
property are recorded. A fee would be charged for renewing a copyright registration in recognition of the costs imposed on the registry itself and on the
searchers. The fee could exceed those costs if it were desired to expand the
public domain by discouraging renewals of works unlikely to have much commercial value.
Tracing costs could be reduced further by requiring, when feasible, that a
notice of copyright be placed on copyrighted works. Such a notice, which would
be a precondition of copyright protection, would indicate the name of the copyright holder and the date of the most recent copyright registration or renewal.17 This would enable a potential user to determine readily whether the
work was still protected and whom to get in touch with if a license had to be
obtained. Notice would reduce tracing costs because the registry would have to
be searched only for the subset of works that were still under copyright.
Under existing law, the point at which copyright protection begins is relatively unimportant because the duration of protection is determined not by
that starting point but instead (except in the case of works for hire) by the
17

For some works, it is true, up-to-date notices would not be feasible or would be too costly
relative to the potential benefits in lowering tracing costs. Suppose, for example, that A sells a
work of art but retains the copyright. A may be unable to place an up-to-date copyright notice
on a work that has been out of A’s possession for many years. Other problems associated with
copyright notices must also be considered. For example, a strict notice requirement might result in cluttering up a work of art with multiple notices that would detract from the artistic
merits of the work. Even in this case, it might be possible to place a notice of the back of the
canvas or on the back of the pedestal on which a sculpture stands.
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death of the author. Under a system of renewals, the starting point becomes
critical. So our suggested system would require a return to something like the
pre-1976 law, where copyright protection generally began with publication or
registration; but we do not explore these details in this paper.
We acknowledge a possible concern with joint ownership of copyrights; the
more owners there are of a property, the greater will be the tracing and transaction costs. But these problems arise in the case of land and other physical
property and are dealt with in a variety of ways, such as by forming a trust or
corporation to own or operate the property, or by allowing partition, and problems of joint ownership of copyrights can be solved in similar ways. The counterpart to partition is the right of any joint owner of a copyright to license its
use, subject to a duty to account for the profits to the other owners. Tracing
and transaction costs reduce the value of property to its owner, thus giving
them an incentive to reduce these costs by consolidating ownership or control.
B. Transaction Costs
The transaction-costs argument against indefinite renewal (compared to
life plus 70 years or a single renewal term) is stronger than the argument from
tracing costs but must not be exaggerated. Transaction costs, like tracing
costs, might actually be lower under a system of indefinite renewal, though
this would depend on how the system was configured, in particular on the
length of the initial and renewal terms and on the renewal fee. Although
transaction costs would be incurred each time a copyright was renewed, consisting mainly of the time costs of the copyright holder and the costs of administering the renewal system, these costs would be slight if most copyrights
were not renewed—and the longer the initial term and the higher the renewal
fee, the fewer would be renewed.
The transaction costs incurred in negotiating for the licensing of that minority of works the copyright on which has been renewed many times would
often be higher. In many cases, it is true, a new work that potentially infringes
the copyright on a very old one will infringe only a single work—for example (if
there had been indefinitely renewable copyright from the beginning of time)
Ulysses and the Odyssey, the movie Clueless and the novel Emma, West Side
Story and Romeo and Juliet, Ragtime and Michael Kohlhaas. And in that
event transaction costs should not be very high, provided that copyright protection is narrow and excludes ideas, mise en scène, and other aspects of expressive works that go beyond the very specific, narrowly defined form or configuration of the copyrighted work. And provided too that there is a broad fairuse doctrine that protects, for example, parodies of copyrighted works from being treated as infringement. But these are settled and economically rational
features of copyright law that we would not suggest be changed.
Transaction costs would be greatest for composite works, such as anthologies. Under existing law, the publisher of a collection of the world’s greatest
poems need obtain copyright licenses for only a subset of the poems—none first
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published before 1923.18 Under a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright
instituted say in 1500 A.D., most of the poems in an anthology of popular poetry might still be under copyright protection and therefore many more licenses would have to be obtained for a new anthology.
The aggregate transaction costs of a system of indefinite copyright renewals would depend on the number (and possibly the value) of licenses (holding
tracing costs constant), the transaction costs per license, and the administrative cost of operating a renewal system. Since the number of licenses would
depend in part on the total number of works renewed, aggregate transaction
costs could actually fall compared to a system of automatic renewals or a single term of life plus 70 years.
We do not wish to be dogmatic about transaction costs, since their magnitude has not been estimated. If they are thought to be very great and especially if they are believed to increase exponentially with increases in copyright
duration, this could be a compelling argument for placing an upper bound on
the duration of copyright under a system of (finite) renewal. Return for a moment to the example of West Side Story and Romeo and Juliet. Shakespeare’s
play copied extensively from an earlier Romeo and Juliet which in turn copied
the plot from Ovid’s story of Pyramus and Thisbe. Had copyright been in force
since Ovid’s day and if Ovid’s heirs had renewed it right up to the present, the
producer of West Side Story might have to get a license from those heirs as
well as from Shakespeare’s heirs (and doubtless from the heirs of the author of
the earlier Romeo and Juliet as well), assuming the Ovidian license obtained
by Shakespeare was limited as it would normally be to Shakespeare’s use of
Ovid’s story in his own works.
C. Public Goods
The public-good argument for limiting the copyright term is valid but overstated. The argument is best understood with the aid of an example. Suppose
the marginal cost of manufacturing and distributing a copy of some novel is $1,
there are no fixed production costs (typesetting and editing costs are zero), but
the author incurs a cost of $1000 (mainly opportunity cost) to write the book—
call this the cost of expression. This is a fixed cost, which because it does not
vary with output does not influence output. As a result, in the absence of copyright, competition among publishers will expand output to the point at which
the price of the book falls to $1, which will just cover the publisher’s manufacturing and distribution costs and leave nothing with which to compensate the
author for his efforts. The incentive of authors to write books will diminish,
and with it the supply of new copyrightable works.19 Copyright protection en18

The copyright on a work first published in 1922 would terminate after 75 years (a 28-year
initial term plus a 47-year renewal term) or in 1997. The Sonny Bono Act adds an additional
20 years protection to works still protected in 1998.
19 For a discussion of why some works would still be produced, and of alterative ways in which
authors might still receive financial compensation in the absence of copyright protection, see
Landes and Posner, note 9 above.
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ables the publisher to charge a price above $1 without worrying about competition from unauthorized copies. A price of, say, $2 would more than cover the
publisher’s costs and enable a financial return to the author, encouraging him
to create new valuable works. But charging a $2 price generates an offsetting
social cost. Potential users who value the copyrighted work at more than $1
but less than $2 will substitute other goods. The result will be a loss of value
(deadweight loss) equal to the difference between these users’ willingness to
pay and the $1 marginal cost. Viewed as an institution for promoting economic
efficiency, the copyright system seeks to balance the incentive gains from pricing expressive works above marginal cost against the deadweight and other
costs. Protection beyond that point would yield additional benefits that were
more than offset by the higher costs.
From this standpoint, however, it may seem puzzling that the copyright
term is so long today, let alone that we should be suggesting that it might be
made even longer by being made renewable indefinitely. On the one hand, the
present value of $1,000 in royalties to be received 95 years from now (life plus
70 years for a work written when the author was 25) is trivial, given any plausible discount rate. On the other hand, such a long term of copyright protection
can create access (deadweight plus transaction) costs by reducing the number
of works at any given time that are in the public domain and can therefore be
appropriated without need to obtain a license.
But this analysis is superficial in two respects. First, just as future revenues must be discounted to present value to determine their value, so future
deadweight costs must be discounted to present value to determine their present cost.20 If the present value of some remote future benefit is trivial, so is
the present cost of the equally remote future deadweight loss. Second, because
the scope of copyright protection is, as noted earlier, very narrow, the size of
the deadweight loss created by copyright protection is likely to be relatively
small. The narrower the scope of a property right, the more good substitutes
there are, the less the owner’s monopoly power is, therefore, and so the smaller
is the deadweight loss that the monopoly creates. It has even been argued that
the optimal duration of a patent would be infinite if the scope of patent protection were narrowed appropriately.21 Conceivably the scope of copyright protection is already so narrow that an infinite copyright term would not be a source
of significant deadweight loss. But this is merely a conjecture (are there good
substitutes, for example, for Shakespeare’s plays or Mozart’s piano concertos?),
and one reason the scope is narrow is that the public domain provides a source
of free inputs into the creation of new copyrightable works. If valuable works
20

But at the same rate? Future benefits should be discounted at the private discount rate because we are concerned with their incentive effect. Future deadweight costs should be discounted at a social discount rate lower than the private rate if it is believed that society has an
interest in its future inhabitants greater than individuals have for their remote descendants.
We do not pursue this issue in this paper.
21 Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth,” 21 RAND Journal
of Economics 106 (1990).
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are withheld from the public domain because the copyright term has been extended, there may be significantly fewer public domain works (weighting
number by quality) upon which to draw, which will reduce competition with
existing copyrightable works.
Our earlier point about the need to discount future deadweight costs loses
most of its force, moreover, if the question is whether to extend the term of existing rather than future copyrights, at least existing copyrights that, unless
extended, will soon expire. Suppose a copyright that was about to expire is extended another 20 years. The deadweight costs will begin to accrue immediately. They still must be discounted, but the present cost will be much greater
than if the discounting were merely of deadweight costs that were to be incurred in a period beginning 75 years from now.22 The case for a system of indefinite renewals may thus be stronger if it is limited to copyrights obtained
after the system is instituted, although a potentially offsetting benefit, reduced
rent seeking, of a system not limited to future copyrights will be noted shortly.
The length of the initial and renewal terms, the fee charged for renewal,
and the scope of renewal (would it be limited to a single work, or could it cover
a group of works?), can be adjusted to produce, as a practical matter, whatever
copyright term is deemed socially desirable; nor need the length, fee, or scope
by the same for all classes of work (books, software, music, etc.). The shorter
the initial grant (it could be as short as 5 or 10 years) and the higher the renewal fee, the shorter the de facto term and so the fewer the number of works
that will be protected by copyright. The composition of the public domain
might well differ under an indefinite-renewal system, because there would be
better sorting of works into two categories: (1) valuable works, where the benefits of property rights may exceed the costs, and (2) works of little value, where
the costs of administering copyright protection are very likely to exceed the
benefits and a stiff renewal fee would discourage the owner from seeking continuing copyright protection. We argue that this sorting may produce a more
efficient system of copyright than the present system.
D. Rent Seeking
Owners of copyrights on old but still commercially valuable works have an
incentive to incur lobbying and related expenses to persuade Congress to extend the copyright term on these works. Retroactive extensions do not enhance
incentives to create expressive works, so if those incentives are the only benefits from copyright, such extensions will increase access and transaction costs
without producing any offsetting value. Moreover, as we just saw, they can be
a potent source of deadweight costs.
Consider Disney’s successful efforts to lobby for the Sonny Bono Act that
retroactively extended its copyrights by 20 years in order to protect its soon-to-

22

This point is emphasized in the economists’ amicus curiae brief in the Eldred case, note 2
above, at 11.
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expire copyrights on Mickey Mouse and other cartoon characters.23 The costs of
these efforts, and of the unsuccessful efforts of competing interests to oppose
the extension, were incurred to obtain and limit economic rents, respectively,
and if there are no offsetting social benefits these costs were wasted from a social standpoint.
Rent-seeking activities are a natural consequence of any fixed copyright
term, since the Congress that enacts the term cannot prevent future Congresses from increasing the term retroactively. There will always be some
copyright holders whose income will be diminished when their works fall into
the public domain, and they have an incentive to seek retroactive extensions
as the end of the copyright term draws near. The problem of rent seeking that
arises from the possibility of retroactive extensions of copyrights would be
solved by indefinite renewals, though an alternative would be to interpret the
copyright clause of the Constitution to forbid retroactive suspensions. Since
indefinite renewals would eliminate the prospect of losing the income produced
by old but still valuable copyrights, there would be little incentive to lobby for
copyright extensions. We say “little” rather than “no” because resources might
still be spent lobbying for lower renewal fees and longer renewal terms. But
normally it would be cheaper to pay the renewal fee than to try to change the
law. Notice, however, that a system of indefinite renewals that was limited to
future copyrights would fail to curb the incentive to seek retroactive extensions
of existing copyrights. Notice, too, that fixing an upper bound to renewals
would leave the rent-seeking problem unsolved, since as the work approached
expiration, if it retained commercial value the copyright holder would have an
incentive to lobby for a right of further renewal.
It might be objected that allowing indefinite renewals would eliminate only
one form of rent-seeking, because copyrights have other dimensions of value,
notably scope, besides duration. However, whatever incentive there exists for
lobbying for expansions of scope exists under the current system; it would not
be greater under a system of indefinite renewals.
III. RATIONING AND MAINTAINING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Congestion Externalities
If we are correct so far, the average copyright duration could well be
shorter under a system of indefinite renewals than under the current system.
Such a system might therefore reduce access costs for most but not all works
compared to the present system. (It probably would not reduce deadweight
costs, because these presumably are generated mainly by valuable copyrights,
which would tend to be renewed.) The public-goods argument asserts, however,
that whatever the case with regard to costs, there are no efficiency or social
benefits from continuing indefinitely to protect even a small number of valu23

See Janet Wasko, Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of Fantasy 85–86 (2001). The
Act went into effect Oct. 27, 1998, four years before the copyright on Mickey Mouse would have
expired.
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able works, and it is this issue that we now take up. The argument assumes
that the only justification for copyright protection is the incentives it produces
to create new works. This may be wrong, or even anachronistic, since until the
1976 Copyright Act federal copyright protection attached at dissemination or
registration rather than at creation
The economic theory of property rights emphasizes not only their incentive
effects, that is, the investment that they encourage, but also their effect in optimizing current uses of property. Frank Knight made this argument many
years ago, using the example of highway congestion.24 An example closer to intellectual property is a natural pasture. The significance of its being natural
rather than cultivated is to abstract from the incentive benefits of recognizing
a property right in it. The natural pasture is not created by human effort and
therefore there is no social value in encouraging investments in creating it.
But in the absence of property rights the pasture would be overgrazed because
none of the users would take account of the cost that his use imposed on the
other users by making their cattle graze more to obtain the same amount of
food. Thus property rights would create a benefit unrelated to encouraging the
creation of new property.
Analogous benefits of property rights are recognized in some areas of intellectual property. They are recognized in trademark law, which does not impose
any fixed limitation on the duration of a trademark, since confusion would result if the same trademark denoted goods of different provenance and quality,
and which, through the concept of “dilution,” protects trademark owners from
the loss of value resulting from nonconfusing duplication of their trademarks
(as where a hot-dog stand adopts the name “Tiffany’s”). And increasingly they
are recognized in the law of publicity rights as well, which prevent others from
using one’s name or likeness in advertising or other commercial uses without
one’s permission. The tendency is to make these rights inheritable.25 The motive is not to encourage greater investment in becoming a celebrity (the incremental encouragement would doubtless be minimal), but to prevent the premature exhaustion of the commercial value of the celebrity’s name or likeness.26
Recognition of an “overgrazing” problem in copyrightable works has
lagged. Typical is the statement of a large group of professors of intellectual
property in opposition to the Sonny Bono Act:
The fundamental difference between tangible and intellectual
property is that intellectual property is a nondepletable commons,
while tangible property necessarily depletes with use. “The trag24

Frank Knight, “Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost,” 38 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 582 (1924).
25 See Mark F. Grady, “A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity,” 1 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 97, 124–126 (1994). See also Douglas G. Baird, “Does Bogart Get Scale?
Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age,” 4 Green Bag (2d ser.) 357, 363–364 (2001).
26 See Grady, note 22 above, at 103, 126.
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edy of the commons” is that failure to recognize perpetual and
transferable property rights in tangible property leads inevitably
to “overgrazing,” as soon as an item of property enters the public
domain from which everyone may draw freely. Recognition of
perpetual property rights leads to economic efficiency, because a
rational owner will optimize the balance between present and future consumption.
There can be no overgrazing of intellectual property, however,
because intellectual property is not destroyed or even diminished
by consumption. Once a work is created, its intellectual content is
infinitely multipliable.27
This is overstated, if only because it ignores the trademark and right-ofpublicity cases—both examples of intellectual property. But before proceeding
further, we must distinguish between technological and merely pecuniary externalities. The externality in the pasture case is technological because it imposes a real cost on third parties (the other grazers), rather than merely altering the distribution of wealth. Refusing to recognize inheritable publicity
rights could impose either type of externality, or both types. If anyone could
use Humphrey Bogart’s name or likeness in advertising, the aggregate value of
that advertising use might be greater even though Bogart’s estate would lose
income. Indeed, if the marginal cost of additional copies of his image were zero,
the marginal utility would also be zero, even though the total utility could be
very great. But the total utility might fall if the lack of excludability and resulting proliferation of the Bogart image led to confusion, the tarnishing of the
image, or sheer boredom on the part of the consuming public. Eventually the
image might become worthless.
Apparently this is a concern of the Walt Disney Company with regard to
its copyrighted characters, such as Mickey Mouse. “To avoid overkill, Disney
manages its character portfolio with care. It has hundreds of characters on its
books, many of them just waiting to be called out of retirement…Disney practices good husbandry of its characters and extends the life of its brands by not
overexposing them…They avoid debasing the currency.”28

27

Denis S. Karjala, “Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act, Submitted to
the Joint Committees of the Judiciary,” Jan. 28, 1998.
28 Bill Britt, “International Marketing: Disney’s Global Goals,” Marketing, May 17, 1990, pp.
__, __.
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FIGURE 1
COPYRIGHT EXTERNALITIES
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Figure 1 illustrates the problem. D0D0 is the demand schedule in period t.
Assume that the work has been under copyright for so long that if the copyright expired today the expected return to the author would have been sufficient to induce its creation. By assumption, therefore, copyright protection in
period t and all future periods would have no effect on whether the work was
created in period t = 0. It would create a deadweight cost illustrated by the
P0Q1Q0 triangle in Figure 1, which is caused by the copyright holder’s charging
a price equal to P0 although marginal cost is zero. Terminating the copyright
in t would eliminate the deadweight loss, as the number of uses of the work
would increase to Q1, i.e., until the value of the marginal use equaled zero. But
now suppose that contrary to the usual assumption about copyrights, additional uses impose technological externalities. Then terminating the copyright
will lead not only to a movement along the demand curve but also to a downward shift (say to D0D1) in the overall demand, destroying value equal to the
difference between the area under the original demand curve D0D0 up to P0
and the area under D0D1 up to a zero price. If the externalities are small, the
difference between the two demand curves could be negative, so that terminating the copyright at t would increase value. But if they are large, termination
will result in a net loss in value. In the limit, additional uses beyond Q0 might
depress the demand curve (as it rotates downward around the point that intersects the vertical axis at D0) until it coincided with the vertical axis. In that
event, terminating the copyright would have destroyed all its previous value—
the area under D0D0 from point that intersects the vertical axis to the initial
price and quantity of P0 and Q0.
But how far is the concern with technological externalities that has been
flagged in reference to publicity rights actually applicable to copyright? A book
or other copyrightable property is, as we noted earlier, a public good; its use by
one consumer does not interfere with its use by any other. This point cannot be
decisive, however; a celebrity’s name or likeness has public good characteristics as well, yet unlimited reproduction of the name or the likeness could prematurely exhaust the celebrity’s commercial value, just as unlimited drilling
0
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from a common pool of oil or gas would deplete the pool prematurely. The same
could be true of a novel or a movie or a comic-book character or a piece of music or painting, particularly with regard to copyrights on components of completed works rather than on the completed works themselves. If because copyright had expired anyone were free to incorporate the Mickey Mouse character
in a book, movie, song, etc., the value of the character might plummet. Not
only would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be
blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as catmeat,
others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of
Minnie. In effect, there would be both a movement along and shift downward
in the demand curve in Figure 1 until Mickey Mouse’s commercial value was
zero.29 To the extent that such appropriations of the Mickey Mouse character
were classified as parodies, they would be sheltered by the fair-use doctrine.
But not all would be so classified,30 and in that event the fair-use doctrine
would not insulate them from liability under a regime of indefinitely renewable copyright.
We do not wish to press the argument too far. While examples can be given
of even works of elite culture that have been debased by unlimited reproduction (the Mona Lisa, the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, and several
of Van Gogh’s most popular paintings come immediately to mind), there are
counterexamples, such as the works of Shakespeare, which seem undiminished
by the proliferation of performances and derivative works, some of them
kitsch, such as Shakespeare T-shirts and the movie Shakespeare in Love.
B. Creation and Copying from the Public Domain
A second economic argument against limiting the duration of copyright is
unrelated to congestion or overuse externalities. It returns us to the question
of incentives. The conventional economic criticism of unlimited duration draws
too sharp a distinction between creation and copying. Imagine a novel published many years ago in which copyright has expired. The novelist is rediscovered and there is a surge in demand for his novels. Since no publisher could
establish a property right in them, the incentives of publishers to publish and
promote them might well be inadequate from a social standpoint. Often the
29

In contrast, in the absence of negative technological externalities, terminating the copyright
would reduce the marginal value to zero. But since the demand curve would be unchanged,
total value would increase because there would be no deadweight cost from termination.
30 The line the law draws in implementing the fair-use defense to copyright infringement is
between complementarity and substitution (or between productive and substitutable uses for
the copyrighted work), see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, “Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,” 82 Columbia
Law Review 1600, 1643 n. 237 (1982); or, so far as relevant to our example, between parody
and burlesque. See Richard A. Posner, “When Is Parody Fair Use?” 21 Journal of Legal Studies 67 (1992). Uses of the Mickey Mouse character that were intended to provide the audience
with a substitute for the Disney Corporation’s productions incorporating the character would
not be considered fair use. See Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., 2002 WL 1068020,
at *2 (7th Cir. May 30, 2002).
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demand for particular works of intellectual property is unknown before they
actually hit the market.31 Suppose an enterprising publisher has only a 20 percent chance of success with obscure public-domain authors. He publishes the
works of five such authors in order to have one success. In the absence of copyright protection, other publishers can wait and see which author sells and then
bring out their own version of his works. Publishers who wait avoid the costs of
failure, but their free riding on the market information developed by the first
to publish reduces the incentive of any publisher to search for potentially successful public domain works.32 The tendency would be for only works of already well-known and safe authors whose works were in the public domain to
be published.
Granted, a system of indefinite renewals is not a panacea for this problem,
since works that were no longer popular would tend not be renewed many
times. This problem would exist even if copyright were perpetual rather than
either duration-limited or indefinitely renewable, since owners of a perpetual
copyright that they considered worthless would not take even modest steps to
assure the continued registration (for example, notifying the registry of
changes of address) that a system of perpetual, as of indefinitely renewable,
copyrights would require be established, as we discussed earlier. A complete
solution would require that the “resurrectors” of old works on which copyright
had expired without renewal, like finders in the law of real property, be allowed to obtain copyright in those works. We consider that possibility later.
For now, it is enough to observe that a system of indefinite renewals would,
depending on the fee, on whether group renewals were permitted, and on the
formalities involved in renewal, somewhat mitigate the problem of incentives
to invest in public-domain works.
Here is another such problem: a publisher would have an incentive to
make changes in any public domain work that he did revive, since he could
copyright the changes; but changes made merely to stake a claim are socially
inefficient. They may create private value for the publisher, but from a social
standpoint they impose higher real costs net of any value created by the publisher’s changes. In other words, extension of the copyright term might reduce
socially excessive product differentiation.33
31

This has been noted in connection with dolls and other goods portraying dead celebrities.
See Ronald Alsop, “Items Portraying Dead Stars Produce Profits Controversy,” Wall Street
Journal, May 10, 1984, § 1, p. 37.
32 In other words, “a work’s public domain status is far from an unqualified incentive for utilizing it…Some of the obvious concerns are whether a copyrighted derivative work will have to
compete with other, often low-budget, low quality copies and whether the producer of the copyrighted derivative of a public domain work is likely to have anything unique in the long run.”
Arthur R. Miller, “Copyright Term Extension: Boon for American Creators and the American
Economy,” 45 Journal of the Copyright Law Society of the United States 319, 324 (1998).
33 Two qualifications should be noted. One is that the publisher’s changes in the public domain
work may be too slight to support a copyright in the derivative work. See L. Batlin & Son v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), for the proposition that to support a copyright in a derivative work based on a public domain work “there must be at least some sub-
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Conversely, if because of its age the novel were in need of an elaborate
scholarly apparatus, re-editing, or other costly additions to make it readily accessible to a modern readership, publishers might be reluctant to undertake
the needed measures, even if they could copyright the scholarly apparatus
(which they could not do to the extent it was deemed a matter of ideas rather
than expression), fearing that the cost could not be recouped in the face of
competition from cheap, barebones editions of the novel. Reviewers might use
the scholarly apparatus, of course without compensation, to explain the book to
the public, who would then buy the barebones edition.
Shakespeare comes to mind here, because the texts of his plays are notably
corrupt; also because it is uncertain that we have all the texts of his plays and
poems. There is a considerable industry in trying to improve the accuracy of
the texts and discover new works by Shakespeare, but it is entirely academic;
despite Shakespeare’s popularity, there does not appear to be a significant
commercial market for the “maintenance” required to maximize the value of
Shakespeare’s works. (Cutting the other way, however, is the fact that the
royalty-free availability of his works reduces the “maintenance” cost to costconscious academics.)
A parallel example would be that of an old movie, on which copyright had
expired, that a studio wanted to issue in a colorized version that would be very
expensive to prepare. Promoting the colorized version might increase the demand for the black and white version, a close substitute for the colorized version. Since anyone could copy and sell the black and white version, the studio
considering colorization would not take into account, in deciding whether to
colorize, the increase in demand for the black and white version. As a result,
the expected revenue from colorization might be less than the (private) costs
and so the movie studio would decide against it.34 This is a good example of a
case in which indefinite renewal might be a complete solution, since, given the
public’s avidity for movies old as well as new, an old movie would be quite
likely to retain enough value to warrant the expense of renewal.
The essential points are illustrated by the copyright on Mickey Mouse.
First, the character has changed in appearance over the years since it was first
created,35 indicating continued investment after the initial creation of the
stantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a
different medium.” The other qualification is that even if the publisher can copyright the
derivative work, a third party can copy the underlying public domain work from the derivative
work without infringing the copyright. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,
499 U.S. 340, 359 (S.Ct. 1991)
34 The implication of this point—that colorization is less likely for movies in the public domain
than for those still under copyright—is empirically testable.
35 For a long time, the changes were in the direction of making Mickey distinctly more youthful appearing. See (with pictures) Stephen Jay Gould, The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in
Natural History, ch. 9 (1980). Recently, however, we learn that “Mickey Mouse—70 years old
in 1998—is getting a makeover, along with other familiar Disney cartoon characters. No more
cutesy, innocuous, not-a-care-in-the-world pet mouse, MM’s about to become more in-tune with
his true rodency and the edgier times and becomes a harried, ’90s creature.” “After 70 Years,
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copyrighted work. Second, should the copyright be fated to expire, Disney
would have an incentive before expiration to change the character further so
that, by copyrighting the changes, it might impede imitations. A further complication is that Mickey Mouse is a Disney trademark,36 and trademarks have
no fixed expiration date. After the copyright expired, copiers would still need to
disclaim a Disney origin in order to avoid trademark infringement; such disclaimers, like conspicuous notices on paintings, might impair the commercial
value of the copy by marring its appearance.
These examples, unlike the analysis of publicity rights and our extension
of that analysis to copyright, show that a case against a definite time limit for
copyrights can be based on the traditional incentive-based argument for property rights, though with a new twist. The new twist is recognition that the
need to invest in intellectual property to maximize its value is not exhausted
in the initial creation of the property. Investment is necessary to maintain the
value of the property as well, and also to resurrect abandoned or otherwise unexploited intellectual property.37
Magnitudes are critical, and in the absence of them only tentative conclusions are possible.38 The reader should recall, however, the theoretical reasons
to doubt that the extension of the copyright term via renewals is likely to impose large tracing, transaction, or deadweight costs, provided that copyrights
already existing when the system of renewals is adopted are not eligible to be
renewed, since extensions of existing copyrights, as we noted, can impose very
large deadweight costs. On the other side of the balance, besides the unknown
significance of congestion externalities in the copyright context, we are told
that the Disney corporation has spent tens of millions of dollars refurbishing
Mickey Mouse, both by subtle alterations in the character and by situating it
in carefully selected entertainment contexts in an effort to increase the appeal
of Mickey Mouse to the current generation of young children, who apparently
Mickey Mouse Develops an Edge,” http://www.mickey-mouse.com/pressreleases.htm. The piece
quotes a media analyst as saying that the character “has progressively been stripped of his
original cheekiness and aggression until the perception is that he is not more than a brand
name. He needs a strong new identity.”
36 Indeed, Mickey’s “primary role today is as the corporate logo of the [Walt Disney] company.”
Wasko, note 21 above, at 125.
37 This is not an entirely novel point. “For a work to be commercially successful, it requires
effort and investment which, while not ‘creative,’ is still necessary to generate value. For example, authors employ literary agents, publishers advertise, etc. With musical composition
and photographs, the collection, arrangement and indexing of the works adds value. With film,
preservation requires constant attention. Even the straightforward act of printing a book entails a risk on investment. Arguably, none of these activities will be pursued as vigorously on
behalf of public domain works as they are for works with ownership rights. And, from an economic point of view, these activities ‘create’ real value.” Edward Rappaport, “Copyright Term
Extension: Estimating the Economic Values” 4 (Congressional Research Service May 11,
1998).
38 Rappaport states that the effect he describes “may be important in some cases, but, we believe, will more often be marginal.” Id. But he does not explain the reasoning or evidence that
leads him to this conclusion.
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have little interest in him. The incentive to make such expenditures would be
impaired if the copyright expired, allowing anyone to use the character, though
the copier could not copy any newly copyrightable features that Disney had
added to the original character.39 (Granted, this would be an important qualification should it turn out that only the most recent version of the character retains commercial appeal; but that seems doubtful.) At the same time, however,
extending the Mickey Mouse copyright, a highly valuable existing copyright,
would be likely to impose substantial deadweight costs, which might well exceed the incentive-promoting and congestion-reducing benefits that we have
identified.
We conjecture that the reason so few classical composers are recorded and
performed is that it is more costly to produce a musical composition than it is,
say, to photograph a painting. The recording company that discovered and revived the works of a forgotten or obscure composer would be risking a substantial amount of money in an uncertain venture that could be imitated if successful. Much less expense would be involved in publishing a book, or even arranging an exhibition, of works of a forgotten or obscure painter. The absence of
property rights in the music of well-known classical composers may also explain another feature of the recording industry. Many different recording companies record the same public domain works of Beethoven, Mozart, Bach and
other well-known composers. Recording companies differentiate their product
by promoting the performer or artist who has signed an exclusive contract with
the company. Because the recording company can, for example, copyright the
Chicago Symphony Orchestra’s recording of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, it
has an incentive to promote that version; it has little incentive to promote the
public domain work of an unknown composer, since it could not appropriate
the benefits of those promotional efforts, as distinct from benefits that might
accrue from a recorded performance of the unknown composer’s work by a
popular performer.
Consider also the effect on the recording of a composer’s obscure works
when his copyrights expire. Our analysis implies that upon the expiration of
Puccini’s copyrights, the rate at which his obscure works were recorded fell
relative to recordings of the best-known works, since an investment in creating
39

The public legislative history of Sonny Bono Act says little about the 20-year addition to the
duration of copyrights on works for hire, such as the Disney copyrights. The main rationale
given for the extension for individuals (remember that the Act extended the term for individuals from life plus 50 years to life plus 70 years) is (1) balance of payments and (2) the fact that
people are living longer (Irving Berlin being a pertinent example). The second point makes
very little sense, since an increase in longevity will automatically increase the length of the
copyright term measured from the author’s death, unless the concern is with the longevity of
his heirs. first point is mercantilist, reflecting the fact that the United States is a net exporter
of intellectual property.) One of the committee reports does, however, explain that the extension of the copyright term “will provide the important collateral benefit of creating incentives
to preserve existing works [in digital format.”] Rep. No. 315, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1996).
This is a point similar to our colorization example.
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a demand for the obscure works would be more difficult to recoup once the
works were no longer under copyright.
If our analysis is correct, Lawrence Lessig’s criticism of the retroactive extension of the Mickey Mouse copyright40 overlooks important though, in the
present state of knowledge, inconclusive economic arguments for extended
copyright protection that are independent of whether the protection is extended ex ante or ex post,41 though, as we have seen, ex post extension involves greater deadweight costs but lower rent-seeking costs. If the method of
extension was periodic renewal, then, since Congress could cut off the right of
renewal at any time, a law authorizing renewals without limit of number
would be less vulnerable to a constitutional challenge than a grant of perpetual copyright ab initio—the latter being flatly inconsistent with granting a
copyright for “limited Times.” Periodic renewal would also have the superior
economizing properties that we have emphasized.
But it would not address the case in which intellectual property that has
fallen into the public domain by abandonment is sought to be revived. Suppose
Tobias Smollett had copyrighted his books but after a few renewals his heirs
had decided the books had no value and so declined to pay the renewal fee.
Our analysis implies that a publisher who wants to publish Smollett’s books
today should be permitted to take out copyright on them, by analogy to the
rule that allows finders to obtain title to abandoned (as distinct from merely
misplaced) property. Unfortunately, the efficient implementation of such a rule
is considerably more complicated in the case of intellectual than of physical
property. In the latter case allowing abandoned property to be withdrawn from
the public domain unproblematically implements the policy that valuable
property should be owned in order to create the correct incentives for its exploitation. But imagine a “finder” of intellectual property who claimed to have
found, and who sought to obtain copyright in and register, all the books in the
British Library on which copyright had expired. Such a claim, if honored,
would be tantamount to “banking” trademarks by simply listing all possible
combinations of the letters of the alphabet, and would create the rent-seeking
and transaction-cost problems that we have elsewhere discussed in the trademark context.42
The problem may not be insoluble. One way to deal with it would be to
limit the acquisition of copyright in previously created works to works created
after the law authorizing such acquisition was passed. Another would be to require the publication of such a work within a specified period of time after
copyright was claimed in it. Another would be to charge a stiff fee for registering such a copyright.
40

See references to these and other retroactive extensions in Lawrence Lessig, The Future of
Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 295 n. 8 (2001).
41 See id. at 197–198.
42 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,” 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265, 281–283 (1987).
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We have yet to consider an important though not fatal objection both to indefinite renewals and to allowing even limited copyright protection for “found”
public domain works. These measures, as we have seen, would create incentives for firms to expend resources on discovering and disseminating obscure
public domain works and on maintaining consumer interest in copyrighted
works that were about to fall into the public domain (the Mickey Mouse example). But these are not expenditures on creating expressive works; they are
marketing expenditures, which are not within the traditional domain of intellectual-property law. Why should a particular subset of such expenditures be
singled out for legal protection? Firms that introduce wine and cigar bars, develop movies about wars in outer space, recognize the potential for health
clubs that combine workout and social activities, or introduce baggy trousers
or pastel colors for clothing cannot prevent other firms from imitating their
marketing innovations. Trademark law may prevent confusingly close imitation and copyright law may protect particular advertising slogans, but these
laws do not prevent competitors from free riding on the information developed
by the innovators.
However, there are at least three possible economic reasons for singling
out the particular marketing expenditures in issue for protection by copyright
law. First, the distinction between expressive works and the marketing of
those works is overdrawn. Consider a record company that develops, promotes,
and distributes new pop records. A few of them will be financial successes but
the others will lose money. Which will be hits and which will be flops is not
knowable in advance. In the absence of copyright protection—and here we are
speaking just of protection against the copying of the sound recordings themselves—unauthorized copying of the hit records will drive their price down to
their cost of manufacture and distribution and leave nothing for covering the
costs incurred in developing and promoting recordings of new songs and new
performers. Copyright protection enables the record company to earn enough
money on the hits to cover both their costs and the production and marketing
costs of the many failures. In effect, copyright indirectly prevents free riding
on marketing and information expenditures that are similar to the expenditures incurred in rediscovering obscure public domain works and in maintaining interest in soon-to-expire copyrighted works.43 To state this another way,
exploring the market for expressive works, the sort of exploration that the
measures we are discussing would encourage, is a stage in the creation of intellectual property.
Second, marketing expenditures associated with expressive works differ
from those associated with the other examples of new products given above
43

This concern is explicit in 303(a) of the Copyright Act, which discourages free riding on
marketing and promotion expenditures of previously unpublished works about to fall into the
public domain by conditioning an additional 45 years of protection on publication. Thus, copyright on works unpublished on January 1, 1978, continues until December 31, 2002, but if published by that date, protection continues until December 31, 2047.
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(wine and cigar bars, health clubs, and so forth) because it is easier in the former case to identify the innovator. Many people could probably make credible
claims of being the first to come up with the idea of baggy pants or pastel
shades of clothing or combining exercise and social opportunities under the
same roof. Having the legal system try to sort out these competing claims
would involve substantial costs that would usually be avoided when someone
was seeking to restore a copyright in an obscure public domain work and
would never arise when one was seeking merely to renew an existing copyright.
Third, many new business ideas may now be legally protectable by “business method” patents. Such protection often provides incentives for firms to
invest in marketing and promotion that would be subject to free riding in the
absence of protection.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT
REGISTRATIONS AND RENEWALS
Data on copyright registrations and renewals during the past 100 years
bear directly on the subject of this paper. If it turned out that all or most copyrighted works created before the 1976 Copyright Act (which became effective
on July 1, 1978) were renewed, the implication would be that a system of indefinite renewals might approach perpetual copyright, though this would also
depend on how steep the renewal fee was. Conversely, if renewals are infrequent even under the current system of nominal fees,44 then probably only a
relatively few highly valuable works would remain under copyright beyond the
initial term even if indefinite renewals were permitted.
A. The Data
The U.S. Copyright Office publishes data on registrations and renewals.45
Although the number of registrations is only a proxy for the number of copyrighted works because registration has always been optional, the 1909 and
1976 copyright acts created strong incentives to register a copyright and to
register it promptly. Not only is registration (or, under the 1976 Act, an application to register) a prerequisite for filing a suit for infringement, 46 but it must
be done before the infringement (or within three months of first publication) if
the copyright holder wants to recover statutory damages and attorney fees. As
noted earlier, the 1909 Act fixed the copyright term at 28 years from the date
of first publication (or, for works that were copyrighted but not published, from
44
45

See note 7 above.
See Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights, various years, published by the U.S. Copyright Office. See also Barbara A. Ringer, “Renewal of Copyright,” in Studies on Copyright: Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition, vol. 1, p. 503 (1963 [1960]).
46 Under the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, the registration requirement only
applies to a “United States work”—i.e., a work first published in the United States or where
the author is United States national or lives here. See Sec. 101 for a complete definition of an
“United States work.”
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the date of registration), and at the end of the term the copyright could be renewed for an additional 28 years (raised to 47 years in 1962 and to 67 years in
October 1998) if the copyright holder applied for renewal within the last year
of the initial term. Beginning in 1992 renewal became automatic,47 so renewal
registrations were sure to decline after that, but not to zero because there was
still an incentive to file, mainly because a renewal registration is prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright during its extended term and of the
facts stated in the certificate of renewal. Another important change in the law
was the extension of federal protection by the 1976 Act from published works
to all works fixed in a tangible medium, whether or not they are published.
This change could be expected to increase the number of registrations without
any increase in the output of copyrightable works.
Our primary focus is on renewals because they allow us to estimate the
expected economic life of a copyright.48 But we need data on registration as
well because the number of initial registrations determines the number of
works that are potentially renewable 28 years later. For example, works renewed in 1938 were registered initially in 1910. To obtain the number of 1910
registrations, however, we have to deduct renewal registrations in 1910 (from
works first copyrighted in 1882) because the Copyright Office includes renewal
registrations in its tabulation of registrations.
B. Copyright Registrations and Renewals
Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate registrations, renewals, and the renewal/registration ratio, respectively, over the past century; the renewal/registration ratio in year t being simply the number of renewals in t divided by the number of initial registrations in t – 28.

47

Remember that these are renewals of copyrights that date from before the effective date of
the 1976 Act, which gave the copyright owner a nonrenewable term of life plus 50 (later 70)
years.
48 Economists have used patent application and renewal data to estimate the expected life and
distribution of patent values. For a summary of these studies, see Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel
Pakes, and Jonathan Putnam, “How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: Uses of
Patent Renewal and Application Data,” 46 Journal of Industrial Economics 405 (1998). See
also note 64 below.
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FIGURE 2
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS (EXCLUDING RENEWALS)
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FIGURE 3
RENEWALS IN YEAR T
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Figures 2 and 3 reveal that copyright registrations and renewals rose rapidly in the twentieth century, but that, as expected, renewals began to decline
in 1992 when they became automatic.49 The rise doubtless reflects an increase
in the number of copyrightable works brought about by growth in the output of
expressive activities, as well as reflecting changes in the copyright law. Why,
then, did both registrations and renewals peak in 1991, declining by almost 20
percent by 2000, with the decline concentrated in the last year? The answer
may be, in part anyway, that the registration fee was doubled in 1991, from
$10 to $20, and increased again in 2000, to $30, while the renewal fee was doubled to $12 in 1991, rose to $20 in 1993, and more than doubled, to $45, in
2000. Although these fees seem small in relation to the inconvenience of registering and complying with other requirements of registration, such as submis49

Recall that the 1909 Copyright Act (effective July 1, 1909) extended the renewal term from
14 to 28 years. Works that been renewed for 14 years in the period 1895 to 1909 were entitled
to a further renewal of 14 years, for a total renewal period of 28 years. We do not include the
14-year extensions in our count of renewals in the 1910 to 1923 period. Our analysis of renewal data begins with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1910, the first fiscal year of the 1909
Act.
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sion of a copy of the work to the Copyright Office,50 Figures 2 and 3 suggest
substantial negative responses to higher fees for both original and renewal
registrations. The effect on the latter is more ambiguous, of course, because of
the automatic renewal amendment in 1992, although the amendment did not
eliminate all incentive to register a renewal, since by doing so an author could
recapture rights in already created derivative works
FIGURE 4
RATIO OF RENEWALS IN T TO REGISTRATIONS IN T – 28
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As Figure 4 shows, the fraction of works renewed increased significantly
between 1910 and 1991, then plummeted—no doubt mainly because of automatic renewal, though higher fees may also have played a role.51 Prior to 1992
(the first fiscal year for automatic renewal), renewal rates ranged from a low of
.03 in 1914 to a high of .22 in 1991. Although the full cost of renewal includes
both a small renewal fee and the monetary equivalent (probably small) of the
inconvenience and other costs associated with renewal, the fact that a small
fraction of works are renewed implies that most copyrights have very little
economic value after 28 years. Put differently, the decision to renew a copy50

Another reason for the decline in registrations may be that since March 1989 registration
has no longer been a condition for bringing an infringement suit for foreign works protected by
the Berne Convention and the World Trade Organization, though it is remains a prerequisite
for seeking statutory damages and attorneys fees. The fact has little quantitative importance,
however, because foreign works are only a small fraction of copyright registrations. See text at
note 54 below.
51 We analyze the impact of fee changes in the regression analysis below, but point out here
that it would be a mistake to think that the ratio of renewals to registrations should not
change in response to higher fees for both renewals and registrations. The mistake lies in failing to note that the ratio of renewals to registrations is calculated from renewals in year t and
registrations in year t–28, and obviously an increase in fees in 1991 could not affect the number of registrations in 1963, the denominator in the 1991 ratio. The only effect of higher fees
on that ratio would come through the effect of a higher renewal fee on the number of renewals
that year. Note also that the renewal ratio in Figure 4 is biased downward from 1910 to 1937
because registrations data from 1881 to 1909 include both new registrations and 14 year renewal registrations (from works first registered in 1867 to 1895). We account for this bias in
our regression analysis
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right depends upon a comparison of the discounted value of the expected future revenues from the copyright compared to the full costs of renewal. If the
latter exceeds the former, the copyright will not be renewed. Since only a small
fraction of works are renewed, it follows that the expected economic value of
the 80 percent or so of copyrighted works that are not renewed is less than the
small cost of renewal. The analysis would not be changed in essentials if, to
reduce administrative costs, an owner of copyrights made a one-time decision
to renew all his copyrights when they expired.
Of course, we cannot dismiss the possibility that some fraction of nonrenewals are due to simple oversight, or careless failure to comply with required
formalities. Ignorance of renewal formalities is possible even when the work
was initially registered, as the book or other work may have gone out of print
(or the equivalent for nonbooks), the copyright may have reverted to the author by contract, and the author may not know about renewal or the renewal
date. Nonrenewals by corporations or other owners of works for hire might
therefore be a better index of decisions not to renew based on lack of commercial value; but we do not have those data.
If, as both the raw data in Figures 2 and 3 and the regression analysis indicate, registrations and renewals respond significantly to modest changes in
fees, it is likely that (1) the size of the public domain will expand under a system of indefinite renewals compared to the present copyright system; (2) the
average value of works in the public domain will decline; (3) the expected economic life of most copyrighted works is short;52 and (4) a system of indefinite
renewals, at least if limited to works copyrighted after the system is created,
will separate valuable works in which continued copyright protection may be
socially efficient from works in which the cost of continuing that protection almost certainly exceeds the sum of administrative and access (including transaction) costs.
C. Depreciation and the Economic Life of Copyrights
Depreciation rates of copyrighted material can be calculated from data on
renewals and registrations. Initial registrations constitute one year’s stock of
copyrighted works. Renewal registrations of those works constitute a different,
smaller stock of the same works 28 years later (renewals must be registered in
the last year of the initial term). The annual rate at which the first stock
shrinks to become the second is the depreciation rate of the first stock. That
rate is given by RENt = (REGt-28)e–δt28 where RENt denotes renewals in t of
works registered 28 years earlier (=REGt-28) and δt equals the annual average
depreciation rate for copyrights registered in period t-28. Figure 5 depicts annual depreciation rates, measured in year t, of works registered 28 years earlier. Thus the depreciation rate of .054 in 1990 (5.4 percent) is the annual de52

The actual life of some of these works is longer; an author may err in his estimate of the
demand for his work and therefore fail to renew his copyright, though in fact the work has
continued value.
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preciation rate of works registered in 1962. The higher the renewal ratio, of
course, the lower the depreciation rate, since we are computing the depreciation rate from the fraction of copyrighted works that are renewed.
Figure 5 indicates that the average annual depreciation rate of copyrighted
works has ranged from a low of 5.4 percent in 1990 to a high of 12.2 percent in
1914 (for works first registered in 1886), the overall average being 8.3 percent.53 The long-term trend (setting to one side the effect, beginning in 1992, of
automatic renewal) is toward lower depreciation, implying that copyrightable
works have become more valuable. One reason may be the increase beginning
in 1962 in the renewal term from 28 to 47 years, which increased the present
value of copyrights by extending their potential term. But given discounting,
the effect should not have been great, and so it is not surprising that most of
the decline in the depreciation rate occurred before 1962.
Why there was any decline in depreciation is unclear, however. Even if the
demand for copyrightable works has been growing, the supply of new works
would be expected to respond at roughly the same rate in order to keep the
real value of copyrights roughly constant. One possible reason for the decline
in depreciation is that new technologies, such as long-playing records, stereo
equipment, radio, and television, have extended the economic life of copyrights. For example, the growth in demand for prerecorded music made possible by technological advances such as radio and television broadcasting, highquality home stereo systems, and even the automobile (which increases the
number of people listening to radio) should have increased the overall demand
for copyrighted music. Some of this demand would be satisfied by older though
still copyrighted music, resulting in higher renewal rates and hence a lower
depreciation rate.
FIGURE 5
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As noted earlier, estimates of depreciation for the years 1910 to 1937 are biased downward
because registration data in the period 1882 to 1909 include renewal registrations.
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Here we should mention a complication arising from the fact that as a result of the signing of the Berne Convention by the United States, copyright
protection was restored for a number of works that were protected in their
country of origin but had fallen into the public domain in this country, mainly
because of failure to comply with the requirements of notice or renewal. This
has two potential effects on the calculation of depreciation. First, if foreign
works were less likely to be renewed (or more likely to fall into the public domain because of improper notice) than U.S. works, depreciation of the latter
would be lower than shown in Figure 5. Second, the size of the public domain
would be smaller today. These effects are likely to have only a negligible impact on our empirical analysis, however, because we estimate that foreign
works constitute only between 1 and 5 percent of copyright registrations.54
The reciprocal of depreciation is the average expected life of a copyrighted
work. Although the statutory term of copyright works first published in the period 1881 through 1972 and renewed for a second term varied from 56 to 95
years, the commercial life (=1/δ) of the average copyrighted work was much
lower, ranging from 8.19 years to 18.5 years for works first registered in 1886
and 1962, respectively. In the first group, 3.3 percent were renewed (in 1914);
in the second, 22 percent were renewed (1990).
It is also possible to estimate the number of works registered in 1934 that
retain commercial value today. We chose that year because works first published then could be renewed for 47 years in 1962, and another 20 years were
tacked on in 1998, so that a copyright first registered in 1934 need not enter
the public domain until 2029. Yet the estimated depreciation rate of works registered in 1934 is .07, implying that of the works registered that year 50 percent had fully depreciated by 1944, 90 percent by 1977, and 99 percent by
2000; fewer than 1 in 750 works registered in 1934 will have commercial value
in 2030. Had renewals been permitted every five or ten years, then after an
initial term of 20 or so years about 99 percent of the works registered in 1934
would have fallen into the public domain by the year 2000 because by then
their commercial value had fallen below the cost and inconvenience of renewal.
Of course, the 1 percent that would still be under copyright would mainly be
the more valuable and enduring works.
D. Depreciation Rates for Books, Graphic Arts, and Music
The Copyright Office publishes separate data on registrations and renewals for books (including, however, pamphlets—which indeed account for 80
percent of the category), music, and graphic arts (applied art, posters, fine
arts, labels, photographs, technical drawings, and maps). As shown in Figure
6, the time trend of these three categories closely tracks the time trend of
overall registrations (the correlation is .99). This is not surprising, because
these categories account for 70 percent of all registrations.
54

We were able to obtain foreign registrations for only some of the years between 1961 and
1977, however.
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FIGURE 6
REGISTRATIONS OF ALL COPYRIGHTS, BOOKS, MUSIC,
AND GRAPHIC ARTS
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In Figure 7 we see that the number of musical copyrights has grown the
fastest, the number of book copyrights the second fastest, and graphic arts the
slowest. We estimated simple regressions of the form log yt = a + rt + u, where
y denotes either book, music, or graphic art registrations, t time, and u the residual. The coefficient r, which measures the rate of growth per year, equaled
.021 (24.5) for books, .025 (41.5) for music, and .014 (7.44) for graphic arts. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) indicate that these growth rates are highly significant.55 The differences in growth rates between any two of the three categories
are also statistically significant.

55

However, books include periodicals for the 1909–1926 period, which artificially increases
the number of book registrations in that period and so lowers the estimated rate of growth. If
we estimate the growth rate from 1927 (rather than 1909) to 2000, the coefficients (and tstatistics) on r are .024 (27.4) for books, .026 (33.3) for music, and .022 (12.8) for graphic arts.
Although the growth rates for books and music are much closer, all differences remain statistically significant at the .10 level.
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FIGURE 7

SEPARATE REGISTRATIONS FOR BOOKS, MUSIC,
AND GRAPHIC ARTS
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We can also link up renewals with registrations for each of the three categories to estimate category-specific depreciation rates, though since the earliest category-specific registration data we have are for 1909, we can only use
renewal data starting in 1937. Figures 8 and 9 graph the renewal ratio and
depreciation rates.
FIGURE 8
THE RATIO OF RENEWALS IN T TO REGISTRATIONS IN T–28
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FIGURE 9
DEPRECIATION IN T OF REGISTRATIONS IN T-28
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Notice that only about 3 percent of graphic-arts works were renewed after
28 years, compared to 8 percent for books and 32 percent for music which
peaked at more than 40 percent for works renewed in 1944 and 1956. Music
renewal rates have been falling sharply since 1956, while book renewal rates
have been rising during this period so that by 1969 renewal rates were greater
for books than music for works first copyrighted in 1942. By the same token,
depreciation rates are highest for graphic arts (averaging about 14 percent)
and lowest for music (about 4 percent), with books in the middle (above 9 percent).56 We also observe declining depreciation rates for both books and
graphic arts, while depreciation of music began to increase in the mid-1950s
and by 1969 was just slightly below that of books.
What explains these differences? The graphic-arts category is dominated
by commercial art, such as advertising layouts and fabric designs for fashion
items, the useful life of which tends to be no longer than the advertising campaign or latest fashion season. (Mickey Mouse is a dramatic exception.) At the
other extreme, music written for one use can have many other uses in the future. For example, a song written for a Broadway show might be recorded by
many different artists over a long period of time or be used as background music in a movie or a television program.57 In addition, music is less tied to cultural change than purely verbal works, which are often extremely topical and
56

We noted earlier that of 10,027 books published in 1930, only 174 were still in print in 2001.
An annual depreciation rate of 5.7 percent would produce this more than fifty-fold decline.
From our data, we estimate a depreciation rate of 8.9 percent for books registered in 1930, but
this is the average rate over the period 1930 to 1958 (the date of renewal). Overall, the depreciation rate for books is 9.2 percent for books registered between 1909 and 1941. The probable
explanation for the discrepancy between this rate and the 5.7 percent estimate is the fact
noted in the text that the book category in our data includes pamphlets and leaflets, which
tend to be ephemeral.
57 Rappaport, note 36 above, at 3 n. 5 remarks that “in the case of music,…its ‘timeless’ quality
allows themes to be recycled endlessly.” Notice, however, that depreciation rates of music rose
in the 1956 to 1969 period, suggesting that more recent popular music is less durable than
works created in the 1920s and earlier.
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therefore depreciate rapidly. Books are more enduring than most applied art if
only because the costs of storing them is relatively low and there is some
chance of turning a book into a movie or rekindling interest in the author.
Whatever the reasons for the differences in depreciation rates across these
categories, the differences bolster the case for indefinite renewals. Current
copyright law does not differentiate among different types of work. All copyrightable works, from computer programs to novels to installation art (which is
typically site-specific and lasts only the length of the exhibition), have the
identical term despite the large differences in commercial life expectancy. A
system of indefinite renewals would automatically distinguish the enduring
from the ephemeral. Most works of graphic art probably would not be renewed
even if the initial term were only five years. Because books and music are
likely to have more lasting value, their renewal rates would be greater. We
have seen that it may be socially beneficial to continue property rights in—and
only in—intellectual property that retains sufficient value to offset access and
administrative costs, because of the investment disincentives and congestion
externalities that are likely to result when valuable property is unowned.
E. Regression Analysis
We can use multiple regression analysis to estimate the impact on registrations and renewals of changes in fees, statutory changes in copyright law,
and changes in the underlying demand for expressive works. Tables 1 (registrations) and 2 (renewals) present the results of our regression analysis, which
provide additional insight into the likely effects of a system of indefinite renewals.
The dependent variable in Table 1 is the logarithm of the annual number
of registrations in the period 1910 to 2000. We present both OLS (ordinary
least squares) and Cochrane-Orcutt estimates (the latter to correct for significant autocorrelation). The independent variables in equations (1.1) and (1.2)
are a time trend (Year), the copyright registration or renewal fee (LogFee) deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the expected copyright duration
(LogE(Life)) computed from our estimates of depreciation, and annual recreation expenditure (LogRecExp) that are for expressive (and thus often copyrighted) works of music, movies, books, and periodicals),58 also deflated by the
CPI. The registration, fee, duration, and recreational-expenditure variables
are in log form; their regression coefficients are therefore elasticities. Equations (1.3) and (1.4) add several dummy variables denoting significant changes
in the copyright statute that are likely to effect the number of registrations.
These include the 1962 amendment extending the renewal term to 47 years
(1962RenExt), the extension of copyright protection to sound recordings in
1972 (1972Sound), the 1976 Copyright Act, effective in 1978 (1976Act), the

58

We estimate that expenditures on expressive goods account for about 50 percent of the recreation category.
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1988 ratification of the Berne Convention effective in 1989 (1988Berne)59 and
the 1998 (Sonny Bono) Copyright Term Extension Act (1998BonoExt), which
added 20 years to the copyright term. These variables take a value of 1 for all
years in which the given change is in effect and of 0 otherwise.
All four equations reveal a significant growth rate of copyright registrations of about 1 to 2 percent per year. The time trend variable (Year) picks up
increases in population, income, wealth, and education that are positively correlated with time over the 90-year period covered by our data and are likely to
increase the demand for expressive activities. A positive time trend was visible
in Figure 2, but regression analysis enables us to conclude that the trend is the
result of (or at least is positively correlated with) an increase in the underlying
growth in demand for expressive activities rather than of changes in fees, the
law, or other policy variables. Although the regression coefficients on recreation expenditures are positive in all the equations in Table 1, only the OLS estimates (equations (1.1) and (1.3)) are statistically significant.
The most interesting result in Table 1 is the negative and highly significant effect of registration fees (t-statistics between 4.6 and 9.1) on registrations. The coefficients on fees yield a negative elasticity of around .20, implying
that a 25 percent increase in fees would reduce copyright registrations by more
than 5 percent, even though fees are very small. (For example, the registration
fee in 2000 was only $30, and it had averaged only $20.48 in 2000 dollars over
the 1910 to 2000 period.) The implication is that most copyrights have negligible expected value, because even very small increases in already very low fees
deter many owners of intellectual property from seeking to register it. While
registration is now optional rather than a precondition of obtaining a copyright, it confers procedural advantages that should motivate any copyright
holder who thinks his work retains significant commercial value to register his
copyright.
The number of registrations is also highly responsive to the expected commercial life (LogE(Life)) of a work, which for all but a few works is shorter
than the statutory copyright term. For example, a 10 percent increase in that
expected life leads, other things being equal, to a 3.2 percent increase in registrations in equation (1.4), and this effect is highly significant statistically.60
Of the remaining variables, only the 1976 Copyright Act and 1988 Berne
Convention dummy variables have statistically significant effects on registrations after we adjust for autocorrelation. Extending the renewal term in 1962
and adding sound recordings to the Copyright Act in 1972 have positive and
significant effects on registrations in the OLS but not in the Cochrane-Orcutt
estimates. It is not surprising that the term-extension variables (in 1962 and
59

The Copyright Act was amended in 1988 (effective in March 1989) to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention. The most significant amendment was to make
copyright notice optional.
60 The only exception to the significant effect of LogE(Life) is equation (1.1). But the significance of this equation in our analysis is marginal because it does not adjust for autocorrelation
and excludes five important statutory variables.
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1998) are insignificant, because the expected commercial life of a copyrighted
work is so much shorter than the copyright term, making an increase in the
term irrelevant to most potential registrants. Amendments to the Copyright
Act that accompanied ratification of the Berne Convention are associated with
about a 10 percent increase in registrations. These amendments (e.g., notice
and the need to record some transfers and licenses became optional) effectively
lowered the full cost (including inconvenience costs) of registration, which in
turn should increase the number of registrations.61
TABLE 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF REGISTRATIONS
(t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent
Variables

Log Registrations

OLS
(1.1)
.013
(3.71)

COREG
(1.2)
.018
(5.44)

OLS
(1.3)
.005
(1.88)

COREG
(1.4)
.018
(4.78)

LogFee

–.31
(9.06)

–.24
(5.57)

–19
(5.93)

–.20
(4.67)

LogE(Life)

.07
(.79)

.35
(3.79)

.37
(4.01)

.35
(3.57)

LogRecExp

.20
(2.49)

.03
(.50)

.18
(2.56)

.02
(.26)

1962RenExt

—

—

.08
(2.28)

.02
(..39)

1972Sound

—

—

.16
(3.80)

.03
(.48)

1976 Act

—

—

.07
(1.77)

–.14
(2.19)

1988Berne

—

—

.12
(2.86)

.11
(1.86)

1998BonoExt

—

—

.02
(.27)

.06
(1.06)

–13.8
(2.43)

–24.1
(5.11)

–.92
(.19)

–24.3
(3.47)

.50
—
.97
90

2.25
.84
.72
89

.87
—
.98
90

2.11
.88
.66
89

Year

Constant
Durbin-Watson
rho
R2
No. observations

61

An offset, however, is that registration for Berne Convention and WTO works is no longer a
prerequisite to being able to sue for copyright infringement, though registration is still required for certain remedies.
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One puzzling result is that the 1976 Act seems, after correction for other
factors, to have reduced the number of copyright registrations by about 14 percent. Since the Act eliminated common law copyright and brought unpublished
works under the federal statute, one would have expected the number of registrations to increase. The negative coefficient on the 1976 Act is the consequence of a sharp drop in registrations in 1978 (the year the Act took effect)—
from more than 420,000 in 1977 to 310,742 in 1978, followed, however, by an
increase to more than 400,000 the following year. If equation (1.4) is reestimated treating fiscal year 1979 rather than fiscal year 1978 as the first full
year of the 1976 Act, the coefficient on the 1976 Act variable becomes positive
and highly significant (.16 with a t-statistic of 3.08), indicating a 16 percent
increase in registrations as a result of the Act. There are no changes in the effect of the other variables when we date fiscal year 1979 as the first year of the
1976 Act.
In Table 2 the dependent variable is the log of the number of renewals per
year. Equation (2.1) presents OLS estimates and equation (2.2) CochraneOrcutt estimates. Since renewals depend in part on the number of works registered 28 years earlier, we include two registration variables—one for annual
registrations from 1882–1910 and the other for annual registrations from
1911–1972—to account for the fact that data on registrations included both
new registrations and renewal registrations through (most of fiscal year) 1910.
We do not include variables for the 1972, 1976, 1988, and 1998 statutory
amendments, as we would not expect them to affect renewals, holding registrations constant. For example, adding 20 years to the renewal term in 1998
increased the expected value (though only slightly) of a renewal but did not affect the incentive to renew because beginning in 1992 renewals had become
automatic.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RENEWALS
(T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent
Variables
Year

OLS
(2.1)
.018
(2.56)

Log Renewals

COREG
(2.2)
.023
(2.61)

LogFee

–.09
(1.08)

–.22
(2.13)

LogRegt-281882-1910

.95
(10.34)

.86
(5.18)

LogRegt-281911-1972

.99
(10.64)

.89
(5.38)

LogRecExp

–.02
(.14)

–.12
(.67)

1962RenExt

–.07
(.69)

–.06
(.48)

1992AutoRen

–.64
(6.37)

–.47
(3.82)

Constant

–36.4
(3.10)

–44.0
(2.99)

Durbin-Watson
rho
R2
No. Observations

1.08
—
.98
90

2.12
.55
.90
89

Table 2 indicates that renewals are highly responsive to registrations 28
years earlier. Not only are both regression coefficients highly significant, but
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are both equal to one—
that is, that for each 1 percent increase in registrations 28 years earlier, renewals increased by 1 percent. As expected, the automatic renewal amendment in 1992 is statistically significant and indicates that renewals fell by
about 50 percent after the amendment. Extending the renewal term from 28 to
47 years beginning in 1962 had no significant effect on renewals, but this is
not surprising. Consider the copyright holder who has to decide whether to renew his copyright after expiration of the initial term of 28 years. Since the expected additional commercial life of such works is likely to be shorter than 28
years, adding 19 years to the renewal period should not significantly influence
the decision whether to renew.
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Turning to the Year variable, we find a statistically significant increase in
renewals of 2 percent per year (holding registrations eligible for renewal constant). This is consistent with a long-term growth in the demand for and hence
in the value of expressive activities, since in response to that growth copyright
holders would have a greater incentive to renew their copyrights. After adjusting for this upward trend, we do not find any significant effect of recreation
expenditures on renewals.62
Like initial registrations, renewals are responsive to changes in fees. Although the coefficient on fees in not significant in equation (2.1), autocorrelation in the OLS estimate produces standard errors that are not unbiased.
Equation (2.2) corrects for this bias and reveals a statistically significant effect
of fees on renewals: a 10 percent increase in the inflation-adjusted renewal fee
results in a 2.2 percent decrease in the number of renewals.63
F. Trademark Renewal Rates
Additional light is cast on our subject by considering renewal rates for
trademarks. A trademark has no fixed expiration date, but maintaining a federally registered trademark (which like a registered copyright confers procedural advantages) requires the owner to file an affidavit during the sixth year
after registration, and in every tenth year, stating that the trademark is still
in use, and he must also file a renewal application every 10 years.64 Prior to
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (effective November 16, 1989), registrations and renewals remained in force for 20-year periods subject to the
owner’s having to file an affidavit of continued use every 10 years. Thus, the
Act reduced both the registration and the renewal periods to 10 years. Since
there is no limit on the number of times a trademark can be renewed, we have
in trademark law a model for how a system of indefinite copyright renewals
might operate.
Since trademarks can be renewed indefinitely, renewals in period t arise
from (1) trademarks first registered in t – 20 and (2) trademarks registered initially in t – 40, t – 60, and so on that had been continuously renewed (the last
time in t – 20) and are still in force at time t.65 Assuming a constant rate of depreciation for trademarks in the interval t – 20 to t, we have the following

62

This result is expected since there is a .87 correlation between the logarithm of recreation
expenditures and Year.
63 The reason equations (2.1) and (2.2) do not include an independent variable for the expected
life of a copyrighted work is that renewals are used to estimate depreciation and hence expected duration, so that adding the log of expected duration to the right-hand side of the regression equation would place the log of renewals for the same year on both sides of the equation.
64 15 U.S.C. § 1058.
65 Since our renewal data run through the end of fiscal year 1999 (September 30, 1999),
slightly less than a decade after the Trademark Law Revision Act went into effect, all renewals in our sample come from trademarks that had been in force for at least 20 years.
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identity: RENt = (REGt-20 + RENt-20)e-δ20 where REN and REG denote renewals
and registrations respectively, t denotes time, and δ the depreciation rate.
Figures 10 and 11 plot renewal and depreciation rates for trademarks from
1934 to 1999, the period for which we have data. Trademark renewals averaged 27 percent, annual depreciation was 6.6 percent, and the expected life
(equal to the reciprocal of depreciation) was 15.4 years. Trademark renewal
rates and the average effective life of a trademark are greater and depreciation
lower than the corresponding data for copyrights (see Figures 4 and 5). For an
exact comparison, between 1934 and 199166 trademark renewals averaged 28
percent, depreciation was 6.4 percent, and the expected life was 15.7 years,
while the corresponding figures for copyright renewals were 14 percent, 7.3
percent, and 14 years. Notice that although trademark renewal rates are double copyright renewal rates, the difference in depreciation and in life expectancy is less than 15 percent. The reason is that during that era trademarks
were renewed after 20 years but copyrights after 28 years. So we would observe substantially higher renewal rates for trademarks than for copyrights
even if depreciation were the same.
FIGURE 10
THE RATIO OF TRADEMARK RENEWALS IN T TO REGISTRATIONS RENEWALS IN
T – 20: 1934–1999
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We use these dates because 1934 is the earliest year for which we are able to calculate
trademark renewal rates (which requires that we have renewals from 1914) and 1991 is the
last year for accurately estimating copyright renewals because renewals became automatic
starting in 1992.
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FIGURE 11
DEPRECIATION IN T OF TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS AND
RENEWALS IN T – 20: 1934–1999
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We also regressed (in logs) trademark renewals in t on registrations and
renewals in t – 20, a time trend (Year), renewal fees adjusted for the CPI and
GNP (LGNP) in logs for the period 1935 to 1999. Both registrations and renewals in t – 20 have positive and highly significant effects on renewals in t;
renewal fees have a negative though only marginally significant effect (t =
1.74); and neither time nor GNP is significant.67 It is not surprising that the
estimated renewal elasticity with respect to fees is relatively small (–.06) and
only marginally significant, because there has been very little variation in
(nominal) registration fees over the past 50 year. Renewal fees were $15 from
1935 to 1945, $25 from 1946 to 1981, were increased sharply in the next two
years (to $150 in 1982 and $300 in 1983), and have remained at $300 since
then. There is some evidence that trademark renewal rates declined following
the substantial fee increases in 1982 and 1983. Renewal rates averaged .27 in
the five-year period 1977–1981 compared to .23 in the five-year period 1984–
1988, when the fees were much higher.
The reason depreciation is lower for trademarks than for copyrights is
similar to the reason depreciation of copyrighted music is lower than deprecia67

The regression equation is
LRent = -4.30 + .72LRegt-20 + ..14 LRent-20 - .005Year + .06 LFeet
(.66)
(11.89)
(6.05)
(1.02)
(1.74)
-.40LGNP + u
(1.45)
R2 = .91 Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.80

n = 65

The analysis also supports the assumption that the depreciation rates on registrations and
renewals in t – 20 are equal. Since the ratio of renewals to registrations average about .21 over
the 1915–1979 period (the relevant time period for the dependent variable, which runs from
1935 to 1999), equal depreciation rates imply that the renewal elasticity in the above regression should be about 20 percent of the registration elasticity. This hypothesis is not rejected.
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tion for books and graphic arts. Like music, a trademark attached to a particular product or service can be extended to new goods and services. A successful
trademark embodies the good will and reputation of the producer. Firms have
an incentive to capitalize on this good will by introducing new and improved
products under the same brand name. The Ford Motor Company initially registered the “Ford” trademark in 1909 for automobiles and parts.68 Since then
Ford has introduced hundreds of new automobiles under the Ford name. Similarly, Bayer first registered its trademark in 1908 for use on synthetic coal-tar
remedies, and later placed the name on numerous pharmaceutical products
that did not exist in 1908.
This analysis suggests that the depreciation rate of trademarks is likely to
be lower than that of books and graphic arts but not particularly likely to be
lower than that of musical copyrights, which like trademarks have potential
uses, for example in new recordings, beyond their first use. (Of course, some
books do too—the novel Gone With the Wind, for example, later made into a
very successful movie.) The data support this conjecture. We find, for the period 1934 to 1991, depreciation rates of 13.4 percent for graphic arts, 9.2 percent for books, 6.5 percent for trademarks, and 4.1 percent for music. These
differences are all highly statistically significant.
Although trademarks can be renewed indefinitely, we find that their average economic life is only about 15 percent longer than that of the average copyright. The much higher renewal fees for trademarks may explain much of this
difference. In 2000, it cost $300 to renew a trademark, compared to only $45 to
renew a copyright.69 However, another factor is that trademarks lapse unless
used, and use is expensive, whereas a copyright can for example be renewed
for a book that is out of print, the hope being that there will be some future interest in the book. Notice, finally, that the indefinite duration of trademarks is
less problematic than would be the case for copyrights, because there are no
social benefits to public domain trademarks, except of course generic ones—but
trademarks fall into the public domain when they become generic (that is, become names standardly designating a class of products, such as “aspirin”).

68
69

The Ford trademark was registered 14 years after its first use in commerce (1895).
Patents have a kind of renewal component too. A patent cannot be renewed after the expiration of its 20-year statutory term; but even for it to remain in force for the full 20 years the
patentee must pay maintenance fees of $880 at 3.5 years, $2020 at 7.5 years, and $3100 at
11.5 years after the patent has been issued. In effect, a patent holder gets to enjoy the full 20
year term only if he “renews” his patent three times. One study indicates that 82.6 percent of
patents were still in force (i.e., had been “renewed”) after 4 years, 57.4 percent after 8 years,
and 37 percent after 12 years. Mark A. Lemley, “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,” 95
Northwestern University Law Review 1495, 1508 (2001). We have estimated depreciation rates
from these data of 4.8 percent over the first four years after issue, 6.9 percent from five to
eight years, and 8.3 percent thereafter. Over the full 20-year period, the depreciation rate is
about 6 percent. Put differently, we estimate an average economic life for a patent (given
maintenance fees) of about 16.6 year, which includes a full 20-year term for about 30 percent
of issued patents
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V. CONCLUSION
The regression results in Tables 1 and 2 are evidence that copyright registration and renewals are indeed highly responsive to economic incentives, as
our theory predicted. The shorter the expected life of a copyright and the
higher the registration and renewal fees, the less likely are both registration
and renewal. This in turn suggests that a system of modestly higher registration and renewal fees than at present, a relatively short initial term (20 years
or so), and a right of indefinite renewal would cause a large number of copyrighted works to be returned to the public domain quite soon after they were
created. Of course, those would tend to be works of low average commercial
value; otherwise the owner would have renewed. And requiring registration
and renewal for copyright protection, rather than, as at present, making these
steps optional, would increase the incentive to take them. Nevertheless, a system of indefinite renewals (or one that combines renewals with a maximum
duration) may enable society to have its cake and eat it too. More works will be
in the public domain, thus minimizing access, transaction, and administrative
costs, while those few copyrights that retain their value will remain in copyright protection indefinitely, with the economic advantages, involving investments in maintenance and the avoidance of congestion externalities, that we
discussed earlier.
Granted, the more valuable works are also those that confer monopoly
power and thus create deadweight loss if the duration of a copyright is extended. But we have given reasons for questioning whether deadweight loss is
a serious consequence of extending copyright, at least if the system of indefinite renewals is available only for works created after the system is instituted.
However, a benefit of indefinite renewal that should be especially emphasized,
but that would be maximized by making the system available to existing copyrights as well, is that it would largely eliminate the rent-seeking problem that
is created by the fact that copyright protection expires at a fixed date. Owners
of valuable copyrights that are soon to expire will (along with enterprises that
would like to appropriate the copyrightable works without charge) expend real
resources on trying to persuade (dissuade) Congress to extend the term.
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